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Many threatened species worldwide rely on patches of remnant vegetation in private
landholdings. To establish private reserves that contribute effectively to conservation
involves a wide range of complex and interacting ecological, legal, social, and financial
factors. These can be seen as a series of successive hurdles, each with multiple bars,
which must all be surmounted. The golden lion tamarin, Leontopithecus rosalia, is
restricted to the Atlantic Forest biome in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This forest is
largely cleared. There are many small remnant patches on private lands, able to support
tamarins. Local NGO’s have successfully used limited funds to contribute to tamarin
conservation in a highly cost effective way. We examined the mechanisms by analysing
documents and interviewing landholders and other stakeholders. We found that the
local NGOs successfully identified landholdings where ecological, legal, social, and some
financial hurdles had already been crossed, and helped landholders over the final financial
hurdle by funding critical cost components. This cost <5% of the price of outright land
purchase. This approach is scalable for golden lion tamarin elsewhere within the Atlantic
Forest biome, and applicable for other species and ecosystems worldwide.
Keywords: law, economics, finance, social, community, incentive, forest, threatened
Introduction
Practical conservation involves complex social-ecological systems (Karanth and deFries, 2010;
Pereira et al., 2010; Perrings et al., 2011; Balmford, 2012; Barnosky et al., 2012;McCarthy et al., 2012;
Waldron et al., 2013; Le Saout et al., 2014; Mace, 2014; Pimm et al., 2014; Schwitzer et al., 2014).
This applies particularly for conservation on private landholdings, which involves legal, financial,
and social interactions between multiple stakeholders (Knight et al., 2010; Bodin et al., 2014; Kamal
et al., 2015a).
The significance of private landholdings for landscape-level conservation strategies has been
examined extensively, with a global classification of approaches recently proposed by Kamal et al.
(2015a). There are recently described examples from Europe (Kamal et al., 2015b), North America
(Wallace et al., 2008; Pocewicz et al., 2011; Kamal et al., 2015b); South America (Tecklin and
Sepulveda, 2014); Australia (Adams and Moon, 2013; Fitzsimons and Carr, 2014). The most
commonly used and heavily studied legal models involve various forms of covenant or easement on
land titles (Merenlender et al., 2004; Pocewicz et al., 2011; Adams and Moon, 2013; Rissman, 2013;
Fitzsimons and Carr, 2014; Stroman and Kreuter, 2014).
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The design of policy instruments to encourage private
reserves includes ecological, social, and economic as well as
legal considerations (Newburn et al., 2005; Paloniemi and Tikka,
2008; Wallace et al., 2008; Kauneckis and York, 2009; Knight
et al., 2010; Raymond and Brown, 2011; Blackmore et al., 2014).
One of the principal ecological objectives is the establishment
of corridors and connections between existing reserves (Crespin
and García-Villalta, 2014), and one of the key economic issues
is the opportunity cost of forgoing agricultural development
(Phalan et al., 2011). One of the key social mechanisms is through
peer exchange and outreach (Kueper et al., 2013), and NGO’s
may play a critical role in these processes (Pasquini et al., 2011;
Stroman and Kreuter, 2014).
Here, we propose a general model for effective practical
private conservation, based on four hurdles: ecological, legal,
social, and financial. The ecological hurdle is: can a particular
parcel of private land contribute significantly to conservation?
The legal hurdle is: do mechanisms exist to convert and maintain
land use and/or tenure for conservation? The social hurdle
is: is conservation an acceptable and defensible land use for
landowners and the society in which they are embedded? The
financial hurdle is: do landowners have funds and time to cover
opportunity, establishment, and management costs for private
conservation? Each of these hurdles commonly has multiple
components or bars, which set the height of the hurdle.
We derive and illustrate this model using the case of the
golden lion tamarin, Leontopithecus rosalia, in the largely cleared
and privatized Atlantic Forest biome of Brazil. From interviews
with the landowners concerned and the organizations that
contributed, we show that local NGOs successfully identified
landholders where all these hurdles save one had already been
overcome. The remaining barrier was the financial cost to
establish and manage a private forest reserve. By meeting this
cost, these NGOs helped the landholders over that final hurdle,
with significant gains for conservation of this threatened species.
Brazil’s Atlantic Forest ecosystem is highly biodiverse (Myers
et al., 2000), but largely cleared (Banks-Leite et al., 2014). Its
original total area was 1,315,460 km2 (SOS Mata Atlântica,
2015a). Of this, only 12.5%, 164,000 km2, remains in patches
>3 ha in area, and 8.5%, 111,800 km2, in patches >100 ha in
area (SOS Mata Atlântica, 2015a). The remnant areas are spread
between 17 states. There are 960 individual public protected areas
containing patches of the Atlantic Forest ecosystem, but only 2%
of these operate under strict no-harvesting regulations (SOSMata
Atlântica, 2015a). Areas of Atlantic Forest also occur within 860
individual private reserves, 1760 km2 in total area (SOS Mata
Atlântica, 2015b).
The golden lion tamarin is one of a number of species
dependent on the Atlantic Forest ecosystem (Raghunathan et al.,
2015). It was listed as critically endangered in 1982 (Thornback
and Jenkins, 1982). Its current status and distribution are detailed
by Rambaldi (2002), IUCN (2014), and AMLD (2014), as follows.
The remaining global population is estimated at 1000 individuals
(IUCN, 2014). The species is now found in only seven of the
24 local-government municipalities in its original range (IUCN,
2014).
There are 46 private reserves protecting 8571 ha of Atlantic
Forest within the 24 municipalities of the original range of the
golden lion tamarin, and 29 private reserves covering 2647 ha
within the seven municipalities of its current range. A count
in 2005 (Holst et al., 2006) found 550 individuals, over half the
remaining global population, on 28 private landholdings. This
was twice the number counted on private land in 1991 (Kierulff
and Oliveira, 1996; Kierulff and Rylands, 2003). There are active
reintroduction programmes from breeding centers to private
reserves (Ruiz-Miranda et al., 2010). Forest conservation and
restoration on private landholdings are thus critical to provide
habitat for current and future conservation of this species (INEA,
2013).
Historically, poaching of golden lion tamarin for the live
wildlife trade was also a major threat to this species (IUCN,
2014). Individual tamarins fetched prices of over USD 20,000
(RENCTAS, 2001). They were found frequently in the illegal
live wildlife markets in Rio de Janeiro, of which there were
over 100 (Rocha, 1995; Polido and Oliveira, 1997; Braga et al.,
1998). Penalties were increased under Brazil’s Laws 5.197/1967
and 9.605/1998. Surveillance by agents of IBAMA, the Brazilian
Institute of Natural Resources, also increased. In the past
decade, only three golden lion tamarins have been found
for sale. Whilst anti-poaching measures continue, therefore,
current conservation efforts focus principally onmaintaining and
expanding areas of suitable forest habitat.
For private reserves to make a successful and significant
contribution to conservation of the species, requires parallel
but independent decisions by numerous individual landholders.
We therefore examined how those individual landholders decide
whether to establish private reserves that can contribute to
tamarin conservation. To identify factors affecting take-up of
private conservation options, we sought information directly
from landholders involved, and from key stakeholders in
government agencies and NGOs involved in these efforts. Since
this is a qualitative study where the primary data are the stated
perceptions and experiences of those involved, our focus is
on the relatively few landholders who have indeed faced and
surmounted all the hurdles and successfully established private
conservation reserves. In particular, we examine the strategic
role of the NGOs, which in this case operates at the final
hurdle.
Methods
We focussed on private reserves in the State of Rio de
Janeiro which had been established in conjunction with the
state government environment agency, Instituto Estadual do
Ambiente (INEA). There are 143 private reserves within this
State, with a total area of 12,859 ha. Approximately one third
of these, 45 in all, were established with INEA. With INEA’s
assistance, we obtained personal introductions to the landholders
concerned. During 2013/14 we were able to obtain data from
34 individual private landholders, involved in 37 reserves (82%).
Golden lion tamarin have been identified on at least 10 of these,
though no formal population counts have been conducted.
We used a semi-structured questionnaire format for
the interviews, with open-ended questions on: landowners’
motivations to establish private reserves; the barriers or
difficulties they faced in establishing and maintaining reserves;
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and how they had addressed such difficulties. A copy is provided
in the Appendix. We obtained responses from 11 individuals
through face-to-face interviews, 8 by telephone, and 15 by
sending copies of the questions in written form, which they
completed and returned. We obtained further information from
reserve application and management documents prepared by the
landholders, and from published and unpublished documents
from INEA (2015), and three NGOs, namely SOS Mata Atlântica
(2012), APN Rio de Janeiro (2015), and the Associação Mico-
Leão-Dourado, the Golden Lion Tamarin Foundation (AMLD,
2014).
We also interviewed the three senior local staff of INEA
who had been most heavily involved in these 37 RPPN’s.
These interviews covered: background information on INEA
and the RPPN Centre; land conservation in the state of Rio de
Janeiro; their perspectives on the main threats to biodiversity
conservation in the state; threats and conservation efforts for the
golden lion tamarin; and partnerships with NGOs and private
landowners. They also addressed: the challenges in developing
and managing private reserves from government and landowner
perspectives; the benefits of private reserves for the environment,
government and landowners; the future of the private reserve
system in the state and nationally; and the role of ecotourism as
an incentive in the establishment of private reserves.
All interviews and most documents were in Portuguese.
Interviews were of approximately 90min duration. Where
interviewee consent was granted, interviews were recorded
and transcribed using Pamela R© software. Interviews were
carried out by Fernanda de Vasconcellos Pegas, a Brazilian
national and native Portuguese speaker, and results translated
to English for joint analysis by all authors. Interviews followed
appropriate cultural protocols, and were conducted with prior
informed consent, in line with research ethics requirements (see
Acknowledgments). All interview materials were collected under
conditions of individual confidentiality, which has been strictly
observed, particularly since some private reserve landholders
and their families had been threatened by armed poachers and
trespassers.
We analyzed the interview transcripts and documents
using an adaptation of standard ethnographic iterative
deconstruction/reassembly approaches (Bernard, 2000;
Silverman, 2010; Punch, 2014). First, we extracted the
smallest-scale concepts from the texts, and assembled them
into higher-level constructs. Secondly, we reconceptualized the
highest-level constructs as a set of hurdles, which landowners
must surmount in order to contribute to conservation of lion
tamarins. Thirdly, we identified specific statements within
transcripts to test and illustrate this conceptual approach.
Results
Stakeholder Perceptions
Stakeholders identified a wide range of ecological, legal, social,
and financial concerns, detailed below. In their interviews and
responses, representatives from government agencies and NGOs
generally provided more information about larger-scale legal and
financial context, and individual landholders generally provided
information about the same issues at much more local scales.
Government representatives were well aware of ecological and
legal factors, whereas individual landowners focused on local
social and financial factors. NGOs were aware of all these factors
and their interactions, providing them with information to
intervene successfully.
Ecological Hurdles
Private reserves can generally make the most effective
contribution to conservation of any particular threatened species
if a number of conditions are met, as follows. (1) Individuals
of the species concerned actually occur on relevant parcels of
private land, or could migrate there, or could be reintroduced
successfully. (2) Where possible, and acknowledging that even
a few individuals can form important reserve subpopulations,
the species occurs in sufficient numbers to make a substantial
contribution to the global population. (3) Where possible, the
individuals form part of a breeding population, acknowledging
that this may also include migratory individuals and adjacent
landholdings, and that decisions by one landholder may
influence neighboring landholders. (4) Where possible, the
individuals add to the overall genetic diversity of the species,
e.g., by including genetically distinct subpopulations. (5)
Where possible, the geographical distribution of the private
conservation areas provides opportunities for individuals to
move between different private reserves, or between private and
public reserves, either independently or through translocations.
(6) Poaching, pathogens, and predation and competition from
feral and invasive species are controlled on private landholdings.
Golden lion tamarin do indeed occur currently on at least
some these private landholdings, even in quite small patches of
remnant forest, in significant numbers and breeding populations.
Our site visits showed that most of these forest patches are in
good condition, and some are undergoing restoration. Some of
these reserves are adjacent to other reserved areas, connected
by continuous forest canopy suitable for tamarins. Some are
surrounded by forest, but that forest is unprotected. There are
opportunities to improve conservation of these remnant forest
areas by expanding the private reserve program, so as to ensure
that connections between existing reserves are not severed in
future. Tamarin breeding and reintroduction programs have
proved successful (Ruiz-Miranda et al., 2010).
Poaching is a significant management problem on seven of
these 37 reserves, with owners subject to threats of violence, but
the poachers are not targeting tamarins. They are after the edible
palm Euterpe edulis, cut illegally for sale as palm heart. They
have machetes and axes, dogs and firearms, however, so they
can damage and disturb habitat and wildlife. Despite difficulties
associated with control of trespass and poaching, however,
private conservation reserves in Rio de Janeiro State can indeed
contribute to conservation of golden lion tamarind, by providing
additional habitat which can support tamarin successfully.
Legal Hurdles
Land tenure systems and land use requirements can provide
major hurdles to private conservation in many countries. Legal
requirements to clear and/or drain rural or agricultural land,
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and/or to stock livestock at a specified minimum density, applied
historically in many countries, including the USA and Australia.
In some cases they still do. In Brazil, private conservation remains
very difficult because of a “use it or lose it” provision in rural
land tenure, part of agrarian reform measures. This provision
required landowners to use their land actively for agriculture, or
risk forfeiting it to the State, which could redistribute it to landless
individuals. Agriculture includes livestock grazing, which need
not necessarily involve forest clearance, but in practice generally
does. Between 1970 and 2011 a total of 302,380 km2 of private
land were confiscated under this law (INCRA, 2014), so this is a
major threat to landowners.
Landholders interviewed in this study made statements such
as “I was afraid the government was going to take my land,”
and “The main objective is to protect even the small fragments
of Atlantic Forest for the future generations, since this assures
the protection of springs within the property.” This blanket use-
it-or-lose-it provision still operates, but has been overridden
in limited circumstances by specific conservation legislation,
outlined below. That is, this hurdle has been overcome, but only
if specific measures are adopted.
A second legal hurdle, also widespread in many countries, is
the need for a system of covenants or easements on land titles, or
enforceable conservation agreements. These are required in order
to ensure that private reserves are maintained and managed for
conservation indefinitely. That is, they cannot subsequently be
(re-)converted to agriculture or other uses, if the current or future
landowners change their minds. This is a significant concern,
because agricultural practices and agricultural crop, commodity
and land values change over time, and so also do the personal
circumstances of landholders and their families.
From a landholder’s perspective, the declaration of a
permanent conservation reserve represents a financial
opportunity cost. This applies even if the land is not currently
valuable for agriculture, or is not currently able to repay the
cost of clearing, or can currently yield a greater financial return
in an undisturbed state, e.g., through ecotourism (Pegas and
Castley, 2014). Those circumstances can change. Landowners
interviewed for this study commented, for example, that: “I want
to save [my land] for my family” and “protect the vegetation and
areas with many springs in perpetuity.”
There are currently two legal systems in Brazil that can
jointly overcome both these hurdles. The first is a requirement,
through the Brazilian Forest Code under Law 12.651 (Brasil,
2012) for land owners to set aside a fixed proportion of their
holdings as a reserve, so called Reservas Legais. The proportion
differs between biomes, and in the Atlantic Forest biome it
is 20%. There are also supplementary requirements, under
the same law, for legal protection of specific local ecosystem
components such as riparian zones. These are known as Areas
of Permanent Protection, APP. From a conservation perspective,
the requirements for Reservais Legais are weak. They do not
require full conservation, but only that forest cover is maintained.
The understorey may still be partially cleared and used for
livestock, for example.
Since these Reservas Legais are a mandatory legal
requirement, however, they remove the need for landowners
to make conservation decisions with opportunity costs.
Interviewees commented, for example, that; “We were not using
that part of the land because it overlaps the area set aside as
Legal Reserve.” This makes it a great deal easier for landowners
to adopt a higher level of conservation, through a Reserva
Particular do Patrimônio Natural (RPPN). These are voluntary
conservation reserves that may be ratified at federal, state or
municipal levels, at the landowner’s choice.
At national level, RPPNs are recognized under Federal Decree
5.746 of 2006, and the enabling agency is ICMBio (2012). At
State level, in Rio de Janeiro the relevant agency is INEA. As
noted earlier, our focus here is on RPPN’s established via INEA.
One interviewee commented: “I [set up my reserve] with INEA
because the federal government treated me poorly.” Another
said that “with INEA there is less bureaucracy,” and another,
that “INEA is more accessible and more actively engaged in the
RPPN cause.” Several also commented on the role of the local
representative of APN Rio de Janeiro (2015) as a champion: “[we
overcame] bureaucracy and red tape thanks to Deise.” This NGO
has strong ties to INEA via the RPPN program.
RPPN’s have much stricter conservation requirements than
Reservas Legais. In an RPPN, no land uses are permitted except
conservation, ecotourism and education, and each reserve must
be managed in accordance with a pre-approved management
plan. RPPNs are not necessarily required to overlap Reservas
Legais or APPs, but in practice they generally do, since this
minimizes opportunity costs. Landowners commented: “I was
able to declare the RPPN as part of the Legal Reserve.” Overall,
therefore, legal hurdles to private conservation in the Atlantic
Forest biome have been overcome through the RL and RPPN
systems. Taking advantage of these legal provisions, however,
imposes some financial costs on landowners, as considered
below. There are also social hurdles to be overcome.
Social Hurdles
Rural landholders do not live in isolation. Typically they
live within a small but powerful social context, which is
provided by neighboring landholders, other local families and
a broader rural community. In some cases, this social context
also includes itinerant individuals such as migrant workers,
landless squatters, and people who trespass for poaching or other
illegal harvesting of natural resources. In some, it also includes
very large-scale competitors such as industrial, agricultural or
agroforestry corporations, and other industry sectors such as
mining, which may compete for water rights. Landholders’
social contexts also include various government agencies. Local
municipalities require rate payments. Public and private utilities
providers are responsible for roads, powerlines, pipelines, etc.
These may improve local economic opportunities, but may also
compete for land. Policies, agencies and taxes of national and
provincial governments also form part of social contexts for rural
landholders.
At local scale, one of the critical social hurdles is the attitude
of neighboring landholders, and other local residents, toward
conservation. Some rural landholders oppose conservation,
either in national parks or in private reserves. In some cases,
this opposition is ideological. In others, the key issue is that
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local residents who were formerly able to access particular
areas informally, e.g., to use or collect natural resources free of
charge, find their access much more tightly regulated or entirely
excluded.
For the private reserve landowners interviewed in this study,
the social hurdles differed between individual sites. In general, the
commercial agricultural value of the properties were low, because
as landowners commented, “My property is small.” Most of these
landholdings were not used for subsistence by the owners, though
one did note that “We do earn a living from the property.”
Some properties had been purchased for amenity value: as one
owner said, “The land was used as a family weekend getaway.”
In general, the landowners interviewed had personal interests in
conservation. As one said: “I created the reserve to protect the
remaining fragments of forest.”
Landowners reported that with very few exceptions, their
neighbors had no objections to RPPNs. Indeed, one landowner
commented that “My neighbors keep an eye on the reserve when
we are not here, in case there are poachers.” There has been
an extended educational campaign about conservation of golden
lion tamarins, so most landowners have favorable attitudes
toward establishing reserves.
The principal social hurdle, for these particular reserves,
was from landless and largely lawless local itinerants. These
itinerants routinely entered private rural properties, technically
as trespassers, so as to harvest the edible palm “palmito-jussara”
for sale as palm heart. Several landowners reported that when
they had confronted such people, they had received threats of
violence or death. Since the intruders were carrying firearms and
operated as illegal gangs, these threats could not be taken lightly.
Financial Hurdles
Worldwide, there are three main financial hurdles faced by
private landowners aiming to establish conservation reserves:
opportunity costs, establishment costs and management costs
(Buckley, 2008). For Brazil’s Atlantic Forest, opportunity costs to
declare the first 20% of any property as an RPPN are very low,
because of the requirement for a 20% RL. The only opportunity
cost is a small marginal change in land management practices.
If a landholder declares a RPPN covering more than 20% of their
property, however, there is an opportunity cost in lost agricultural
potential for the proportion beyond 20%.
According to the landholders interviewed, operational costs
are also low for most of these private reserves. Interviewees listed
the key management requirements as control of fire, invasive
species and poaching. Of these, poaching is the most serious
threat and the most difficult to control, but it is only severe on
a few landholdings, and as outlined in the preceding section, is
principally a social rather than a financial issue.
Establishment costs, however, represent a significant financial
hurdle for most of the landholders interviewed. These involve a
number of components. Firstly, it takes time for landowners to
assemble all the information needed, and from the perspective of
the landowners, this time represents a cost. Secondly, in order to
apply for an RPPN, the boundaries of the area concerned must be
georeferenced, so there is a survey cost. Thirdly, the application
process is conducted through the courts, which are only available
in cities, so there is a travel cost in order to apply. All of these costs
are incurred in order to apply for an RPPN, with no guarantee of
success.
Once an RPPN is established, landowners must submit a
written management plan to the ratifying agency, in this case
INEA, within 5 years. These plans must meet predefined criteria
and be prepared to professional standards, both costly. RPPN
areas must be fenced to define boundaries and exclude livestock,
and fencing is relatively expensive both in time and materials.
Landowners are responsible for all these costs.
Costs were mentioned by many of the interviewees as a major
barrier to establishing private reserves. They said: “It is too
expensive to create a RPPN,” and referred to “financial resources
that we don’t have.” Different interviewees placed different
emphases on the various components: “it is too expensive to
get documents certified”; “too expensive to hire someone to do
[georeferencing]”; “I have yet to get financial support to develop
the management plan.”
In the view of the landowners interviewed, it is these
application and establishment costs, more than any other hurdle,
which deter private landholders from establishing RPPNs that
can contribute to conservation of golden lion tamarin in Brazil’s
Atlantic Forest biome. These costs are commonly USD 10,000
or less for a typical small landholding. Whilst this is an order
of magnitude less than the equivalent costs in North America
(CCALT, 2015), it is about a year’s average income in Brazil (Guia
Trabalista, 2015; IBGE, 2015; World Bank, 2015). For Atlantic
Forest landholders who have a well above-average city-based
income elsewhere, and use their rural properties principally for
recreational amenity, these costs may not form a major barrier.
The same may also apply to the relatively few landholders who
have established successful small-scale ecotourism businesses on
their properties (Pegas and Castley, 2014). For those landholders
who survive on small-scale agriculture, however, the financial
cost of establishing a RPPN is an insurmountable hurdle.
There are government incentive programmes intended to
address this issue, but on their own, these programmes are
insufficient. RPPNs are exempt from rural land taxes, but for
a typical small reserve, this saves the landholder only about
USD 25. Landowners interviewed noted that “the tax breaks
are very limited”; and “money from tax breaks is irrelevant.”
Payments for Ecological Services, PES, may also be available
in some cases. The principal PES is known as E-ICMS,
Ecológico Imposto sobre Operações relativas à Circulação de
Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços de Transporte Interestadual
e Intermunicipal e de Comunicação. ICMS is the Brazilian state
taxation system, “Tax on the Circulation of Goods and Services
across interstate lines” PES under the E-ICMS, however, are paid
to municipalities (ICMS Ecológico, 2014), and may not be passed
on to individual landowners. The landowners interviewed also
dismissed E-ICMS, saying: “There is no financial support from
the government”; and “I haven’t received any support.”
Competitive grants, known as editais, are offered by the NGO
SOS Mata Atlântica (2014), in partnership with Conservation
International, specifically to offset RPPN establishment and
management conservation costs (Conservation International,
2012). Over the decade 2003–2012 inclusive, this program
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allocated a total of US$1,874,140 to 553 RPPNs within the
Atlantic Forest biome nationwide (SOS Mata Atlântica, 2012).
In the landowner’s perceptions, however, these editais provide a
relatively small and uncertain opportunity to recover application
and establishment costs.
Recognizing these complexities and hurdles, a local NGO,
the Golden Lion Tamarin Foundation (GLTF), has successfully
established a strategic funding programme which essentially
covers the residual costs for the landholder, not met from
other sources, in establishing RPPNs. The GLTF targets tamarin
habitat in four key municipalities, in partnership with SOS Mata
Atlântica. Of the 37 private reserves studied here, 21 had received
assistance from this NGO. Landowners commented that they
had: “received financial support from the NGO,” and that “the
NGO helped with the costs of mapping” and “the NGO gave me
funding to develop the management plan.”
For these landholders, all the previous hurdles have already
been overcome. By lifting landholders over this final hurdle, the
NGO creates private reserves, contributing to conservation of the
golden lion tamarin, at a cost far below that of outright land
purchase. The cost of establishing RPPN’s can be approximated
from data provided by SOS Mata Atlântica (2014). Between 2002
and 2012, this NGO sponsored 493 RPPNs throughout Brazil,
covering a total area of 57,000 ha, at a total cost of Rs. 6,000,000.
This is USD 1,923,000 at current exchange rates (Mar 2015),
yielding an average cost of USD33/ha. The current market price
of rural land in the municipality of Silva Jardim in the State of
Rio de Janeiro, where most of the RPPNs in the current range
of the golden lion tamarin are located, is in the range US$4000–
16,500/ha depending on location and local infrastructure.
Even allowing for higher-than-average costs of establishing
private reserves in these prime areas, the cost of conservation
via RPPN’s is still well below 5% of the cost of outright land
purchase, and in some cases, only 1% or less (Buckley and Pegas,
2014). Since the Golden Lion Tamarin Foundation commenced
operations, 46 RPPN’s covering a total of 8571 ha have been
established within the original range of the golden lion tamarin
(CNRPPN, 2015).
This approach has thus demonstrated success, and could be
expanded to include additional areas.
Discussion
The ecological, legal, social-political, and economic-financial
contexts for effective conservation of golden lion tamarin
on private landholdings in Brazil’s Atlantic Forest biome are
highly complex and cross-linked. Most stakeholders directly
involved may perceive only parts of these processes, especially
if those particular parts are their responsibility or expertise.
Successful conservation outcomes, however, can be achieved only
if all these components are adequately considered and adjusted
simultaneously.
The model presented here treats these components as a series
of successive hurdles: ecological, legal, social, and financial. Each
hurdle contains subsidiary components, which may be thought
of as bars which add to the height of the hurdle concerned.
We derived this model from a qualitative analysis of materials
from interviews with reserve landowners and other stakeholders,
together with relevant documentary materials. That is, from a
formal methodological perspective these four hurdles are the
higher-tier constructs into which we have assembled the two
dozen individual concepts which we extracted from the interview
materials, and which we have described here as the bars of each
hurdle.
Adopting the hurdle model or analogy provides the
opportunity to extend our results from this particular case
study, golden lion tamarin in Brazil’s Atlantic Forest biome,
to the incorporation of private reserves in threatened species
conservation much more generally. Methodologically, the hurdle
model is a grounded theory derived from a saturated set of
interviewees under generally similar circumstances. From those
interviews, we conclude that landholders differentiate about two
dozen individual factors, forming four higher-tier constructs.
Our model takes one further step, linking these four higher-
tier constructs by expressing them as hurdles that must all be
surmounted for conservation to succeed. Through this additional
step, we propose a generalized model applicable to private
conservation worldwide, and testable for many other species,
countries, and circumstances.
This model is apparently novel. It builds on previous reviews
and classifications such as that of Kamal et al. (2015a) by
separating the components of successful private conservation
into a series of successive stages, seen here as hurdles, which must
be surmounted in sequence. As outlined in the Introduction,
previous studies have considered ecological (Crespin and García-
Villalta, 2014), legal (Rissman, 2013), social (Knight et al., 2010;
Raymond and Brown, 2011), and economic (Phalan et al., 2011)
aspects, but none has previously assembled these into a combined
model which shows how an NGO (Pasquini et al., 2011; Stroman
and Kreuter, 2014) can most effectively leverage its limited
financial and political resources. We propose that this model is
sufficiently general to be applicable across a wide range of biomes
and ecosystems, jurisdictions and legal systems, countries and
cultures, and socioeconomic situations.
In the particular case of the golden lion tamarin in Brazil’s
Atlantic Forest, the hurdle model makes it clear just how effective
and focused a strategy was adopted by the local NGO, the
Golden Lion Tamarin Foundation (GLTF). Amidst a morass of
competing and conflicting factors, operating at different scales
and through different stakeholders, they were able to identify
a critical opportunity and apply limited resources with great
effectiveness and efficiency. Through close involvement in golden
lion tamarin conservation over an extended period, they achieved
a tacit expert knowledge of conservation dynamics on private
landholdings. This enabled them to adopt a successful strategy,
without ever constructing a formal analytical framework as we
have attempted here.
A recent case study from Kenya (Van Wijk et al., 2015)
suggests that “conservation NGO’s should act as ‘opportunity
seekers,’ focus on incremental rather than radical innovations,
[and] note voids and ambiguities in governmental policies that
provide opportunities for non-state actors to assume the role of
institutional entrepreneur.” This is precisely what GLTF has done
in Brazil’s Atlantic Forest. The four-hurdlemodel, developed here
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to analyse the GLTF approach for golden lion tamarin, could
thus be applied for the analysis of other private land conservation
initiatives worldwide. The approach suggested by Van Wijk et al.
(2015) in Kenya, and taken by GLTF in Brazil, could well be
adapted, expanded and copied, for a wide range of threatened
species throughout Brazil and other countries.
Within Brazil, this model could be applied to the role of
private reserves in conservation of other threatened species in
the Atlantic Forest biome (Santos and Costa, 2008; Ferraz et al.,
2012; Fink et al., 2012). It could also be applied for conservation
of threatened species occurring on private lands in other biomes,
such as white-browed guan Penelope jacucaca, gray-breasted
parakeet Pyrrhura anaca, and rufous-breasted leaftosser Sclerurus
scansor cearensis in the caatinga (Farias et al., 2005); and bare-
faced curassow Crax fasciolata, king vulture Sarcoramphus papa,
and black-chested buzzard-eagle Geranoaetus melanoleucus in
the cerrado (Lazara, 2011; Posso et al., 2013). To date,
partnerships between conservation organizations and private
landowners to promote the establishment and management of
RPPNs are relatively uncommon within Brazil. One notable
exception is for leopard in the Pantanal (REPAMS, 2013).
There are well-established analogs to RPPNs in other
countries, with some structural similarities. Conservation
easements in the USA, for example, have been studied
extensively from both social perspectives (Cross et al., 2011;
Farmer et al., 2011, 2015; Sorice et al., 2013; Ghimire et al.,
2014; Meyer et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2014); and also from
legal perspectives (Colinvaux, 2012; Deal, 2012; Jay, 2012;
Lindstrom, 2012; McLaughlin and Pidot, 2013; Sundberg,
2013). There are comparable systems in Australia, known as
voluntary conservation agreements. These are more variable and
experimental than in the USA, less well-developed, and less
heavily studied to date (Woodroffe et al., 2010; Ollenburg and
Buckley, 2011; Adams and Moon, 2013). The four-hurdle model
could be applied to analyse all of these approaches.
The GLTF approach may have ecological as well as economic
limitations. Private reserves can contribute most effectively to
conservation of golden lion tamarin if they are incorporated
into a broader integrated strategy. Such a strategy protects
remnant Atlantic Forest in on private landholdings firstly in
order to maintain landscape scale links and connectivity between
public protected areas, and secondly to maintain as large a total
habitat area as possible. However, our study did not determine
whether other landholders, currently without RPPN’s, possess
equally valuable forested areas, and would be equally amenable
to establishing RPPNs. In addition, golden lion tamarin are
a charismatic and iconic threatened species which can attract
funding for conservation NGOs, and gain public and landholder
support for NGO conservation initiatives. They can thus act as a
flagship species to promote the establishment of private reserves,
and these reserves can then also contribute to conservation
of other less well-known species in the Atlantic Forest biome.
However, as withmany conservation efforts (Bennett et al., 2015),
it may well-prove more difficult to achieve private conservation
reserves in area lacking such charismatic flagship species.
By framing conservation of threatened species on private land
as a series of successive hurdles, conservation advocates and
analysts can examine a checklist of constraints, identify which
are most critical and where they are most readily overcome, and
plot a path to maximize the effect of conservation outcomes. This
approach recognizes that whilst geographic patterns in biological
diversity are indeed one key constraint, this ecological hurdle is
only the first of four. The ecological, legal, social, political, and
economic contexts for conservation are continually changing.
We suggest that a multi-factor hurdle model that considers
all these complexities, but simplifies them into an operational
process, can make a more effective contribution than analyses
which consider only one group of factors at a time.
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Appendix
Issues Addressed in Semi-Structured Interviews
with Landholders
Background about the private property and landowner
Do you live on your property?
How many years have you lived on your property?
What year did you or your family purchase this
property?
How many hectares is your property?
Demographics
What is your gender?
How old are you?
What is your education level?
What is your profession?
Conservation importance
Does the RPPN overlap with any other protected area, or is
it located near one?
Does the RPPN overlap with the Legal Reserve?
Is there an Area of Permanent Protection (APP) within
your property?
Does the RPPN overlap or coincide with the
APP?
Is the RPPN located within a watershed? If yes, what is the
watershed name?
Are there any endangered fauna and flora within the
RPPN? If so, what species?
Are there tamarins on your property?
Background information on the RPPN
What year was the RPPN created?
What is the area of the RPPN?
Why did you establish your RPPN?
How did you first learn about RPPNs?
What challenges did you encounter during the
establishment phase of the RPPN?
What challenges did you encounter during the process of
establishing the RPPN?
What actions could ameliorate these challenges?
What are the benefits of creating a RPPN?
Support from and perceptions about NGOs, INEA, Government
Have you received and support fromNGOs or government
agencies?
If so, what types of support, and from which entity,
organization and/or agency?
Have you partnered with any NGO’s to achieve
conservation goals? If so, which NGO’s?
Financial contributions and challenges
Do you promote tourism within your RPPN?
Do you receive tax benefits from the establishment of your
RPPN?
If so, what benefits, and how much are they worth?
Did tax benefits influence your decision to create your
RPPN?
Do you make a living off your property? From the RPPN?
Do you generate any income from your property? From the
RPPN?
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